The past few days have once again highlighted the complexity surrounding the issue of Hezbollah's weaponry, as it faces increasing international pressure.
US diplomacy, led by envoy Thomas Barrack, has presented a "roadmap" aimed at disarming Lebanon of Hezbollah’s illegal weapons stockpiles. According to reports in the Lebanese media, this initiative is structured in three phases: the voluntary dismantling of weapons depots and their transfer to the Lebanese Armed Forces; the establishment of government control over the border with Syria; and legislation prohibiting non-state actors from possessing weapons. This plan is accompanied by promises of significant economic aid—$2.5 billion for emergency infrastructure rehabilitation, the lifting of personal sanctions on former ministers, and a new debt framework with the International Monetary Fund.
Lebanese media further report that alongside these promises come stern warnings: without a clear Lebanese response by November 2025, a "diplomatic starvation strategy" will be launched, revoking Lebanon’s backing in international forums.
The official Lebanese response to Barrack's document called on the US to pressure Israel into withdrawing from the five remaining outposts still held in southern Lebanon and to cease the Israeli air strikes.
These five hilltops, located in open terrain and overlooking Israeli communities on the opposite side of the border fence, in effect “dominate” the area on both sides. Those positions are considered critical to defend Israeli border communities and to preventing Radwan brigades from attempting to re-establish themselves there, despite their daily attempts to do so. Since the beginning of the ceasefire in late November 2024, there have been over 450 air strikes against Hezbollah infrastructure in Lebanon—around half of them in southern Lebanon. This count does not include special forces operations in the area, which the IDF admitted last week have taken place over the past months.
In response to the discussions between the Lebanese government and the United States, Hezbollah has been targeting different audiences with varied messages. Naim Qassem repeatedly emphasizes that any call to disarm Hezbollah serves foreign interests and undermines Lebanon’s ability to defend itself. Meanwhile, the group continues to reinforce the narrative of Resistance. In this context, there is a clear insistence on retaining the weapons of the Resistance and explicit declarations that Hezbollah will not relinquish its arms—for example, as part of its Ashura campaign.
Lebanon’s new leadership allegedly seeks Hezbollah’s disarmament. President Joseph Aoun continues to stress his commitment to a state monopoly on arms, while clarifying that disarming Hezbollah must occur through “dialogue, not coercion,” in order to prevent a new, devastating civil war.
The Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, in a recorded speech on his official X account on June 5, 2025—marking 100 days since his government took office—stated that the Lebanese Army has dismantled over 500 Hezbollah weapon storages south of the Litani River since the end of the war. He underscored his administration’s commitment to implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1701. It should be noted that the LAF hardly provided evidence for those numbers.
In contrast, the Muslim Shiite Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, takes a more cautious stance. Although he has held discussions with President Aoun about placing weapons under state authority, he has previously emphasized: “no one accepts Hezbollah’s disarmament.”
Ultimately, as long as discussions focus on Hezbollah’s “voluntary disarmament,” it simply won’t happen. Hezbollah and other Lebanese factions will enact every possible maneuver to ensure the weapons remain in Hezbollah’s hands—or worse, that Hezbollah becomes part of the Lebanese Army. This most dangerous scenario—a de facto Hezbollah takeover of the Lebanese military—is not only all too realistic but also preventable.
In this scenario, the West may believe Hezbollah has disarmed, while in reality its organizational structure remains intact, ready to withdraw from any agreement or impose its agenda at will. We have witnessed similar patterns in Iraq and Syria, where militias supposedly integrated into state armies continued to operate independently or under the Islamic Republic of Iran.
This could happen since no one in Lebanon—including Hezbollah—wants a civil war (Lebanon has already endured two of them). Consequently, compromises could lead to this “quiet takeover,” supported by ongoing demographic shifts in Lebanon, where an estimated 50% of the population is Shia Muslim—the natural base of Hezbollah. Even today, the Lebanese Army is not doing enough. There are problematic officers within the Lebanese military, such as Suhail Harb, who heads the Southern Lebanon intelligence unit, and Yahya Al-Husseini, a communications officer in Southern Lebanon, both of whom collaborate with Hezbollah.
Despite all the challenges, there is today a historic opportunity to reshape Lebanon's future. Hezbollah’s military and political power has been severely damaged: at least 70% of its rocket arsenal was destroyed by Israel; thousands of its operatives—including hundreds of commanders—were killed or wounded, mostly during the “Pagers” attack in the opening of Israel’s offensive against Hezbollah in September 2024. The charismatic leadership under Hassan Nasrallah was decimated, and the organization is now even more dependent on Iranian mentoring—while Iran itself is licking its wounds. Hezbollah has lost its prestige, both within Lebanon and across the region.
Despite all of this, Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsor continue to adamantly reject any idea of disarmament, portraying armed resistance as essential to their identity and deterrence strategy against Israel. Consequently, Hezbollah is currently focused on reconstruction on three levels: militarily and operationally—evidenced by repeated attempts of fighters, including those from the elite Radwan unit, to move southward. From March 2025, up to the present, those killed from the Radwan unit make up nearly 30 percent of the total 52 Hezbollah operatives eliminated south of the Litani River.
The second layer involves attempts to smuggle and produce weaponry. These efforts face significant obstacles due to the new Syrian regime’s activity on the border with Lebanon—with at least three smuggling operations intercepted in recent weeks—and ongoing Israeli strikes targeting these efforts throughout Lebanon. Roughly half of the IDF’s air strikes during the ceasefire have been aimed at Hezbollah operatives attempting to move south and conducting terror or smuggling operations; the other half targeted Hezbollah’s terrorist infrastructure and military sites.
Therefore, it is critical to preserve Israel’s freedom of action to strike whenever intelligence indicates Hezbollah violations—consistent with what appears to be the unofficial agreements with the United States.
The third layer is economic—the attempts to smuggle cash needed to rebuild civilian infrastructure and compensate Hezbollah’s Shia base for war losses. These efforts are encountering obstacles due to Hezbollah losing its hold over Hariri Airport—and especially because Iran is increasingly unable to transfer funds. In recent months, Hezbollah has repeatedly halted its cash distributions to its base, a move criticized for the low compensation amounts provided.
The three layers of Hezbollah’s reconstruction are encountering significant challenges. Thus, despite the risks, the true opportunity for change lies in several factors: uncompromising US pressure; Israeli operations that hinder Hezbollah’s rebuilding efforts; and what’s happening in Iran and Syria, which complicates the flow of weapons and funds to Hezbollah. But none of this is sufficient on its own. In fact, the only way to disarm Hezbollah is to separate Hezbollah from its popular base.
Hezbollah’s civilian infrastructure enables it to remain a powerful player in Lebanon’s system and to use the its Shiite civilians as a human shields, concealing its terror infrastructure within civilian areas in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa valley, and the Dahiyah district of Beirut. Even if arms smuggling and production are temporarily disrupted, over the long term, as long as Hezbollah remains a social movement with broad support in Lebanon, it will ultimately be able to regain its weaponry.
This requires the fulfillment of two terms: First, the Lebanese state must become the sole provider of civilian services to the population, thereby filling the vacuum created by Hezbollah. Second, Hezbollah itself must be unable to offer these services due to a lack of funds and damage to its infrastructure. Cutting off financial flows is not enough; there must be physical disruption of its ability to maintain these civilian infrastructures.
Hezbollah must not be allowed to maintain a broad social platform that provides services to the population in the way it currently does. A Hezbollah local election campaign video made this point vividly: “When you were denied medicine, I gave it to you. When you had no food, I gave it to you. When there was a fuel shortage, I gave it to you. What more is left?”—with the implied answer: vote for Hezbollah. This is the connection that must be broken in order to make Hezbollah lose its relevance to Lebanon’s Shia population—its Base of support.
And to those who argue that Hezbollah has a legitimate right to function as a political party—a political party is not meant to provide welfare, education, healthcare, and similar services instead of the government.
The Lebanese state must shut down Hezbollah’s banks, educational system, student organizations, supermarkets, pharmacies, medical services, gas stations, and similar institutions under Hezbollah’s control. These constitute a parallel or alternative infrastructure that functions as a state within a state. Many of them operate under what Hezbollah refers to as “the Executive Council.” This entire network prevents the Lebanese state from functioning within Hezbollah’s Shia base.
Ultimately, the disarmament of Hezbollah is a long-term process. It cannot be claimed that delays are caused by Israeli activity or presence in southern Lebanon. In fact, the delay stems from Lebanon’s reluctance to go all the way on the issue, and from Hezbollah’s determination to retain its weapons. The key to real change lies in severing Hezbollah’s ties with its civilian support base, while preserving Israel’s freedom of security action and promoting international involvement to assist in building a truly strong and sovereign Lebanon.
Lt. Col. (ret.) Sarit Zehavi is the founder and president of the Alma Research and Education Center, an expert on Israel's security challenges on the northern border. She is a member of Forum Dvorah.