Since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas War, also known as the Iron Swords War, China’s position toward Israel has undergone a noticeable shift. Initially, Beijing issued highly critical and confrontational statements against Israel. Over time, however, these positions softened, and by the time the war between Israel and Iran erupted in June 2025, China had shown relatively increasing support for Israel and adopted a more critical tone toward Iran.
What prompted this change in policy? How does the broader Middle Eastern theater react to Beijing’s strategic calculus, and what course should Israel pursue in its relationship with China going forward?
The Israel-Hamas War
With the launch of the Iron Swords campaign and the United States’ unequivocal support for Israel, China transitioned from a position of ambiguity on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to one of clear pro-Palestinian alignment. For China, the war in Gaza represented another opportunity to challenge US influence in the Middle East and to present itself as a viable alternative global power.
While China’s engagement in the region predates the current conflict, its growing activism during the war has positioned it – perhaps for the first time – as a consequential political actor in the Middle East. China has embraced its role as a leader of the “Global South,” offering a new model of governance rooted in stability and efficiency, aligning well with the authoritarian regimes across the Arab world.
In this context, Israel has functioned as a convenient tool for China to symbolically confront the United States.
Yet Beijing’s conduct must be understood within the broader framework of its regional interests. Saudi Arabia, for example, constitutes a strategic cornerstone in China’s Middle East policy and is affecting it both economically and geopolitically. Economically, Saudi Arabia is China’s largest trading partner in the region, with bilateral trade exceeding $100 billion. Moreover, Riyadh is China’s primary oil supplier in the region.
However, the Sino-Saudi relationship is not limited to energy. It reflects a convergence of long-term visions: China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030. Both are designed to transform these nations into regional powerhouses – Saudi Arabia in the Middle East and China on a global scale. Their partnership includes massive investments in infrastructure, technology, and artificial intelligence.
Strategically, China’s alignment with Saudi Arabia also serves as a counterweight to the US-backed India-Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC). Hence, China’s regional involvement is not merely economic or political – but profoundly strategic.
The Israel-Iran 12-day war
While it is too early to fully assess the long-term implications of the Israel-Iran war, a noteworthy trend is China’s relatively conciliatory approach toward Israel, in contrast to its uncharacteristically harsh criticism of Iran.
Beijing’s critiques of Tehran are twofold:
• Iran’s inability to learn from past failures of other states – including China’s own reform experience post-1978 – highlighting Iran’s rigid ideological dogmatism.
• More sharply, Chinese scholars branded Iran as a “paper tiger,” implying that it is weak and unsustainable as a strategic partner.
From Beijing’s perspective, the war demonstrated that Iran is lagging behind the regional and global pace, and that its ideological bloc is disintegrating. Prominent Chinese voices argued that China should pragmatically pursue its interests and disengage from failing partners. In essence, Iran is no longer an asset to China – and possibly even a liability – and Beijing must realign its Middle East policy accordingly.
Notably, Chinese social media – particularly Weibo (China’s equivalent of Twitter) – reflected this emerging consensus. Many posts praised Israel’s surgical military operations, its avoidance of civilian casualties, and framed its actions as legitimate self-defense. Some bloggers even portrayed Israel’s intelligence penetration of Iran as near-mythical.
Although Weibo is technically unofficial, it is tightly monitored and shaped by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Therefore, public narratives emerging on the platform often mirror internal CCP sentiments – even when the Party maintains formal diplomatic caution. In this light, the Weibo discourse indicates a strategic reassessment within China: Iran is increasingly viewed as a burden, while Israel’s regional value is rising.
Regional engagement
Despite China’s evolving stance toward Israel, Beijing continues to criticize Israel over the Gaza campaign. Unlike Iran or Hezbollah, the Palestinians are still perceived – especially within China’s Global South worldview – as defenseless victims. Thus, China remains rhetorically committed to the Palestinian cause.
This presents an opportunity for Israel: It should actively integrate China into post-war Gaza reconstruction. Given China’s vast capabilities in infrastructure and development projects, such involvement would entrench Chinese investment and, by extension, increase Beijing’s stake in regional stability.
This could incentivize China to act against extremist actors and foster cooperation with moderate Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. If Israel provides political space for Chinese-led reconstruction projects – possibly with American endorsement – this trilateral cooperation could yield strategic dividends.
Such engagement also aligns with Israel’s broader interest in mitigating US-China tensions.
Encouraging ad hoc cooperation between Washington and Beijing in the Middle East can prevent the region from becoming a zero-sum battlefield between great powers. Israel benefits from both increased stability and renewed engagement with China – without compromising its strategic alliance with the United States.
From the US perspective, encouraging Chinese involvement in reconstruction could improve Washington’s image in the region, portraying it as a peace-building power rather than merely a pro-Israel actor. This could be politically advantageous for the current administration and contribute to restoring American credibility.
Strategic implications for Israel
Israel should leverage China’s shifting stance on Iran, recognizing that Tehran’s theocratic rigidity and destabilizing behavior no longer serve Beijing’s long-term strategic interests. China seeks regional stability to advance its own development-focused grand strategy, and Iran, in its current form, undermines that goal.
Israel should seek to align with China where interests converge – particularly on containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions and curbing regional instability. Given China’s economic and political leverage over Tehran, Beijing’s recalibrated posture could mark a strategic turning point.
The Israel-Iran war may become a watershed moment for reshaping China’s approach to the region. If Israel plays its diplomatic cards wisely, it could redefine its bilateral relationship with China as part of a broader regional realignment.
The writer is a guest contributor at Mitvim Institute, a strategic advisor at KPMG, and a researcher in international relations and East Asia.